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MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 206 LIABILITY 
AFTER GLORIA’S RANCH: RIGHTS, REMEDIES, 
REVOLUTION
Andrew D. Martin?
INTRODUCTION
For Louisiana oil and gas attorneys, the biggest summer blockbuster 
of 2017 did not come at the box office. The Second Circuit released its 
opinion in Gloria’s Ranch L.L.C. v. Tauren Exploration, Inc., et al1 on 
June 2, 2017, and the immense significance of the decision was apparent 
on impact. One aspect of the decision particularly raised eyebrows: the 
court’s determination that a mortgagee of a mineral lease could be held 
liable for a failure to acknowledge the extinction of the lease.2 The liability 
allegedly arose via Louisiana Mineral Code article 206, which requires 
former owners of a mineral right to provide an act evidencing the 
extinction of that right upon written demand by the party in whose favor 
the right has extinguished.3
As of January of 2018, the case is pending before the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, which granted writs in December of 2017. As such, this 
article is intended less as a summary of a specific result, and more of an 
exploration of the legal questions related to Mineral Code article 206 
liability implicated by the Second Circuit’s decision. Broadly, the article 
addresses the right of a landowner to receive a recordable act evidencing 
extinction of a mineral right after demand, the remedies available to that 
                                                                                                            
Copyright 2018, by ANDREW D. MARTIN.
? Attorney, Davidson Summers, APLC. The author is indebted to the 
following for their perspicacious commentary on the substance of this article: 
Randall S. Davidson, Grant E. Summers, J. Davis Powell, and Wm. Lake Hearne, 
Jr., of Davidson Summers APLC, and Ian E. Roberts of Baker Botts, LLP. On a 
personal level, the author is grateful for the boundless love, indefatigable patience, 
and irrational confidence of his wife, Heidi Kemple Martin, Esq., and his parents, 
Prof. Patrick and Dr. Ann Martin, without whom this article certainly would not 
have been possible. 
1. Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 223 So. 3d 1202 (La. Ct. 
App. 2017).
2. This article limits itself to a discussion of the Article 206 liability issue, 
but the remaining issues are certainly interesting and the author concurs with the 
Court’s decisions on those matters.
3. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:206 (1982). 
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landowner if the former owner of the right fails to comply, and the 
revolution of the Gloria’s Ranch court finding a former mortgagee liable 
under article 206. 
Part I of this comment will provide a brief summary of the factual and 
proceeding history of the case. Part II will give an overview of the relevant 
statutory law. Part III will analyze the nature of the article 206 obligation 
and scrutinize the Second Circuit’s application of the law to the facts of 
the Gloria’s Ranch case. Part IV will explore how the liability for a breach 
of an article 206 obligation should be shared, and will be followed by a 
short conclusion. 
I. CASE SUMMARY
A. Factual Background
The plaintiffs in Gloria’s Ranch own over one thousand mineral acres 
in southern Caddo Parish, spreading across Sections 9, 10, 15, 16, and 21 
of Township 15 North, Range 15 West.4 Though this area would eventually 
become a hot spot of Haynesville Shale activity, it was mostly regarded as 
a staid Cotton Valley area in the early years of the new millennium.5 The 
plaintiffs leased the mineral rights to Tauren Exploration, Inc.6 in September 
of 2004.7 The lease was a simple one: a Bath Form, paid up lease with a 
single page addendum, concerned largely with surface operations and 
restrictions.8 The lease had a three-year primary term, contained a Pugh 
Clause, and provided for a 3/16th royalty.9 Other than the large geographical 
area leased, it was an unremarkable contract. 
                                                                                                            
4. The acreage covered by the lease at issue in Gloria’s Ranch totals 
1,390.25 acres. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1207.
5. The Haynesville Shale is an upper Jurassic-age shale lying directly 
beneath the Cotton Valley group. Andrew M. Heacock, The Frac-As over 
Property Taxation of Louisiana Oil and Gas Wells, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES.
179, 209 (2013); Thomas E. Kurth, Michael J. Mazzone, Mary S. Mendoza & 
Chris S. Kulander, The States’ Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region 
American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing 14 (2011), https://perma.cc/C86Q-
FBLP. See also Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 144 So. 3d 791 (La. 2013) for 
another case involving southern Caddo Parish and the transition between Cotton 
Valley development and Haynesville exploration. 
6. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1207.
7. The “Lease.” Id.
8. Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease, Book 3712, Page 236, Reg. No. 1941789, 
Caddo Parish Conveyance Records. 
9. Id.
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A year and a half after taking the lease, Tauren assigned an undivided 
forty-nine percent interest in it to Cubic Energy, Inc.10 On March 5, 2007, 
still within the primary term, Tauren and Cubic executed separate credit 
agreements with Wells Fargo Energy Capital, Inc., a subsidiary of Wells 
Fargo & Company.11 Wells Fargo Energy primarily operates as a capital 
provider to all sectors within the energy industry.12 In this case, Wells 
Fargo provided Cubic with a revolving credit facility, with no more than 
$20 million to be outstanding at any time.13 Wells Fargo secured its 
advances by taking a mortgage on Cubic’s interest in the lease. Notably, 
Cubic’s mortgage contained a provision prohibiting Cubic from releasing 
the lease without the prior written consent of Wells Fargo.14
Tauren, through a contract operator, drilled Cotton Valley15 wells on 
the plaintiff’s property in Sections 9, 10, and 16 in 2007.16 In 2008, 
Gloria’s Ranch’s property in Sections 15 and 21 was included in producing 
Haynesville units operated by Chesapeake Operating, Inc.17 The Cotton 
Valley wells in Sections 9, 10, and 16 produced natural gas at fairly low 
                                                                                                            
10. “Cubic” hereafter; see Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1207.
11. Id. at 1207-08. See also Wells Fargo Energy Group, IPAA Private Capital 
Conference 7-9 (Jan. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/C8BC-QFBK, for Wells Fargo’s 
own description of Wells Fargo Energy Capital, which will be referred to hereafter 
simply as “Wells Fargo.” Tauren’s credit agreement and mortgage were not 
included in the record. 
12. Id.
13. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1207-08; John T. Bradford, Damn the 
Torpedoes: Continuing to Finance U.S. Oil and Gas Operations in Tumultuous 
Times, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 22.05 (2009):
Revolving credit facilities . . . are committed facilities providing a 
maximum amount of capital, which the borrower can borrow, repay, and 
re-borrow as needed over the life of the loan. The borrower is typically 
entitled to specify the benchmark interest rate and interest period for each 
specific borrowing under the facility as amounts are advanced. 
14. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1208. This provision will be referred to as 
the “Consent to Release Clause.”
15. The Cotton Valley formation is “a tight gas play in Northeast Texas and 
Northwest Louisiana located just above the Haynesville/Bossier Shale.  It is 
Upper Jurassic and Lower Cretaceous in origin and consists of sandstone, 
limestone, and shale. The depth of the Cotton Valley formation is roughly 7,800 
to 10,000 feet. Although it is mainly a natural gas play, some oil has been 
produced in parts of the Cotton Valley.” Cotton Valley Tight Gas, Oil & Gas 
Journal, https://perma.cc/E9GE-VF4Z (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
16. Id.
17. Id.; additionally, Gloria’s Ranch executed a top lease to Chesapeake for 
the Section 21 property. 
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volumes after the expiration of the lease’s primary term in the fall of 
2007.18
In November of 2009, Tauren assigned its interests in the lease below 
the Cotton Valley formation to EXCO USA Asset, Inc. for $18,000.00 an 
acre.19 Tauren maintained its fifty-one percent interest in the shallower 
depths.20 In conjunction with this assignment, Cubic assigned an 
overriding royalty interest in the deep rights to Tauren, who then 
immediately assigned a portion of it to Wells Fargo.21 Tauren also assigned 
a ten percent net profits interest to Wells Fargo in exchange for a release 
of the mortgage on Tauren’s deep rights interests.22
In late 2009, Gloria’s Ranch began to suspect the lease had expired for 
a failure to produce in paying quantities and requested information from 
Tauren, Cubic, EXCO, and Wells Fargo on the revenue and operating 
expenses of the Lease.23 After an unsatisfactory response from Tauren, 
Gloria’s Ranch sent a letter to all four parties demanding a recordable act 
evidencing the expiration of the lease, pursuant to Mineral Code article 
206.24 The act was not provided, and Gloria’s Ranch filed suit on June 14, 
2010.25
B. Suit and Trial Court
The plaintiff’s petition claimed that the lease expired at some 
unspecified point for a failure to produce in paying quantities and that, 
pursuant to article 207 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, the defendants 
owed damages as a result of their failure to provide a recordable act stating 
                                                                                                            
18. Id. For example, according to the data available on SONRIS, the Gloria’s 
Ranch LLC 9 well in Section 9 never exceeded 600 mcf of production for a single 
month after August of 2008. The Section 10 well, the Gloria’s Ranch LLC 10 
well, is even less impressive, having failed to break 300 mcf in a single month 
after September of 2008. Back-of-the-envelope math using the monthly natural 
gas wellhead prices listed indicates that the former well was only pulling in around 
$1,000 in revenue a month after the summer of 2008. Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/9N3X-8U7Z.
19. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1208. EXCO USA Asset, Inc. will be 
referred to hereafter as “EXCO”.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1208-09.
24. Id. at 1209.
25. The Petition is available in the Caddo Parish suit records, under suit 
number 541,758. Petition, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202 (No. 541,758).
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as much.26 These damages included “lost leasing opportunities” damages: 
the potential amounts of bonus payments, royalties, and rentals that the 
plaintiffs were unable to realize because of the defendants’ refusal to 
acknowledge the extinguishment of the lease.27
EXCO entered into a settlement agreement with Gloria’s Ranch in 
August of 2014.28 A trial on the claims against the remaining defendants was 
held in August of 2015.29 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court declared 
that the lease had expired due to a failure to produce minerals in paying 
quantities.30 The court assessed damages of $18,000.00 per acre (a total of 
$22,806,000.00) against Cubic, Tauren, and Wells Fargo in solido for the 
plaintiff’s lost leasing opportunities.31 Further damages of $726,087.78 were 
assessed against the same defendants for the failure to properly pay royalties 
due from the Section 15 production.32 Lastly, the court found that Gloria’s 
Ranch was entitled to nearly $1,000,000.00 in attorneys’ fees.33 In response 
to motions for new trial filed by the defendants, the trial court amended its 
judgment on November 23, 2015, to reduce the damages by twenty-five 
percent to account for the EXCO settlement.34 All defendants appealed. 
C. Appellate Decision and Current Status 
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s November 23, 2015 
revised judgment on appeal. The appellate court agreed that the Lease had 
automatically terminated for a failure to produce in paying quantities and 
                                                                                                            
26. Petition, ¶¶ 6, 10, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202; Mineral Code article 
207 sets forth the damages due for a breach of an article 206 obligation and is 
discussed in Part III of this comment.
27. Petition, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202.  
28. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1209.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court essentially awarded treble damages for this award, pursuant 
to LA. REV. STAT. § 31:140 (1975), the royalty due ($242,029.26) plus two times 
that number. This calculation was hotly contested because Mineral Code article 140 
does not, on its face, clearly authorize this tripling. However, a review of the history 
of the improper payment issue compels the conclusion that this is, indeed, what the 
legislature intended in enacting article 140, a fact recognized by the Gloria’s Ranch 
panel, and by other courts. See Wegman v. Central Transmission Inc., 499 So. 2d 
436, 451 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 478 (La. 1987); Samson 
Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. v. Smith, 175 So. 3d 967, 984 (La. Ct. App. 2014), 
on reh'g en banc (June 10, 2015).
33. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1209.
34. Id.
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that all defendants were solidarily liable for the refusal to acknowledge 
this termination in response to the article 206 demand from Gloria’s 
Ranch.35 In doing so, the Second Circuit overruled a trial court finding that 
Wells Fargo had been assigned a portion of the working interest of the 
lease; instead, Wells Fargo qualified as a “former owner” of the lease due 
to the nature of the particular security devices in its financing contracts 
with Cubic.36 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in 
every other respect, including the damages amounts.37
The Second Circuit opinion barely survived applications for rehearing 
filed by the defendants: both new judges on the rehearing panel would 
have granted rehearing, while the original three members of the panel 
would not have.38 Justice Bleich’s dissenting opinion painted a bleak 
picture of the oil and gas industry’s future in Louisiana if the majority’s 
opinion was maintained.39 All defendants subsequently filed applications 
for writ of certiorari, which are currently pending before the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, all of which were granted on December 5, 2017.40
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Louisiana Mineral Code article 206 is titled “Obligation of owner of 
expired mineral right to furnish recordable act evidencing extinction or 
expiration of right; mineral lease” and reads, in pertinent part: 
[W]hen a mineral right is extinguished by the accrual of 
liberative prescription, expiration of its term, or otherwise, 
the former owner shall, within thirty days after written 
demand by the person in whose favor the right has been 
extinguished or terminated, furnish him with a recordable 
act evidencing the extinction or expiration of the right.41
                                                                                                            
35. Id. at 1213-24; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1794 (2018) explains: “An obligation 
is solidary for the obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole performance. 
A performance rendered by one of the solidary obligors relieves the others of 
liability toward the obligee.” 
36. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1221-24.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1225-26. 
39. Id.
40. News Release, Clerk of Sup. Ct. La., https://perma.cc/NT5Q-5AY4 (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2018).
41. LA REV. STAT. § 31:206 (1982). The Second paragraph of Mineral Code 
article 206 concerns mineral leases that expire before the end of the primary term 
and is not discussed herein. 
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Article 207 gives teeth to article 206 by imposing on the former owner 
liability for attorneys’ fees and “all damages resulting” from his failure to 
provide the instrument demonstrating the extinction of the right.42 These 
damages are not available if there is a good faith dispute as to the 
extinction of any mineral right other than a mineral lease.43 A mineral lease 
automatically terminates if it fails to produce in “paying quantities” after 
the primary term.44 A lessee’s article 206 obligation arises purely from the 
statute and is not a facet of the mineral lease itself because, after the 
expiration of the lease, the lessee has no continuing contractual duties to 
the lessor.45
III. THE OBLIGATION 
A. Mortgagee Liability
The Second Circuit’s decisions on the paying quantities and damages 
issues, reinforcing prior jurisprudence, are important; its ruling on a 
lender’s liability for a breach of an obligation owed by former mineral 
rights owners is paradigm-shifting. This ruling is incorrect and should be 
reversed. 
Wells Fargo’s legal relationships with the lessor and lessees existed 
solely through its role as a lender to the lessees. Oil and gas financing 
arrangements are often complex in practice, but the character of the 
devices providing for payment and securing the lender in the event of 
default are easily understood. Similarly, it is not difficult to see why an 
aggrieved lessor, like Gloria’s Ranch, would have an incentive to pursue 
a lender through its relationship to the lessees. 
1. Context: O&G Financing 
There were essentially three points of contact between Wells Fargo 
and the Gloria’s Ranch lease: (1) a net profits interest (NPI) in the lease, 
                                                                                                            
42. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:207 (1982).
43. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:208 (1975).
44. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:124 (1976); Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 
886, 888 (La. 1953); Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., L.P., 188 So. 3d 263, 
265 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
45. See Shanks v. Exxon Corp., 674 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 679 So. 2d 436 (La. 1996). This does not, of course, absolve a lessee from 
obligations already incurred. See Patrick S. Ottinger, What’s in a Name? 
Assignments and Subleases of Mineral Leases Under Louisiana Law, 58 ANN.
INST. ON MIN. L. 283, 327 (2011).
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(2) an overriding royalty interest (ORRI) in the lease, and (3) a mortgage 
over the lease.46 In the world of oil and gas operations financing, there is 
nothing unusual about a lender having these types of ongoing interests in
leases. 
Oil and gas exploration and production operations are highly capital 
intensive.47 Despite the many brilliant technical innovations in drilling 
over the last few decades,48 the basic task remains expensive, difficult, and 
speculative: an operator is still punching holes in the ground that stretch 
thousands of feet vertically (and sometimes horizontally as well) and 
hoping to find and extract gasified or liquefied dinosaurs.49 An average 
Haynesville well alone will cost an operator over nine million dollars to 
drill.50 For many operators, financing is a necessity. The nature of the 
planned production operation will generally dictate the sort of lending 
arrangement between the financier and the operator.51 Smaller operators 
often have to rely on private equity financing or complex mezzanine 
                                                                                                            
46. The “Mortgage” hereafter.
47. Bradford, supra note 13, § 22.02; Jeffery A. Zlotky, Equity Financings –
Selected Issues in Structuring and Negotiating Private Equity Investments in Oil 
and Gas Companies, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (2006).
48. See Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and 
Administrative Responses to A New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 325 
(2015) for a discussion of how new technology has helped to reduce the costs of drilling. 
49. Benjamin Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems in Allocation of 
Production to Owners of Non-Participating Royalty Interests in the Era of 
Horizontal Drilling, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 774-75 (2013):
[F]ixed costs of drilling alone are just a part of what makes exploration 
an expensive venture. On top of these significant capital outlays are those 
less-quantifiable, yet perhaps greater, potential expenses that spring from 
the persistent risks that accompany hydrocarbon development. These 
include dry holes and structural integrity failures of the wellbore. The 
weight of this risk increases significantly when utilizing new, and at 
times unproven, drilling methods.
Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and 
Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 687 (1994). Horizontal wells in hard-to-exploit 
formations incur the additional expense of huge amounts of water, necessary for 
the fracking process used to “open up” the formation. Laura Springer, 
Waterproofing the New Fracking Regulation: The Necessity of Defining Riparian 
Rights in Louisiana's Water Law, 72 LA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2011). Lastly, see Our 
History, LA. CHEMICAL ASS’N, https://perma.cc/44XU-22GW (last visited Jan. 4, 
2018) (“Louisiana rests on the graves of dead dinosaurs, a Jurassic Park of oil and 
natural gas that was compressed into the bowels of the earth eons ago.”). 
50. Ryan King, We Need A Fracking Baseline, 77 LA. L. REV. 545, 581 (2016). 
51. Bradford, supra note 13.
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arrangements.52 Financing  exploratory wells in a field with unproven 
reserves will typically require equity capital, rather than debt capital, 
because of the lack of an assured cash flow to repay debt.53 A known 
prospect, like the Cotton Valley play targeted by Tauren in Gloria’s 
Ranch, allows a borrower a bit more latitude in the sort of capital 
obtained.54
Cubic was able to secure an impressively-sized credit facility of 
twenty million dollars in 2007, a feat that likely would not have been 
possible just a year later. By late 2008, a credit crunch had begun to 
squeeze the oil and gas industry, one that followed the doldrums of the 
wider U.S. economy after the subprime crisis.55 Commodity prices fell, the 
stock market plummeted, and many small operators were left with little to 
no access to capital for their operations.56 These conditions led to a shift
of financing arrangements in favor of lenders.57 In times of either feast or 
famine, however, oil and gas lenders employ a variety of methods to 
secure their investments. For instance, the lender may require ongoing 
payments structured as Volumetric Production Payments or Pledged 
Production Payments.58 In addition, the lender may receive equity 
“kickers” of some sort, providing a permanent interest in the specific 
leases at issue, either as non-operating interests (like overriding royalties 
or net profits interests) or sometimes, a portion of the working interest 
itself.59 Lastly, a lender will almost always cover the borrower’s interests 
with a dedicated security device to obtain direct control over these interests 
upon a default of the borrower’s obligations. Conventionally, the 
execution of a mortgage covers all, or a portion of, the borrower’s 
                                                                                                            
52. Jeffrey S. Muñoz, Financing of Oil and Gas Transactions, 4 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS & ENERGY L. 223, 225-26 (2008); Reese B. Pinney, Capital Sources for the 
Small Independent Oil and Gas Company, 49 LA. B.J. 292. For a good overview 
of private equity investing in E&P companies and projects, see Zlotky, supra note 
47. Mezzanine financing in the oil and gas financing arena typically refers to “the 
combination of a borrowing base revolver with the assignment by the borrower of 
an ‘equity kicker’ to the lender.” Bradford, supra note 13, § 22.05. 
53. Bradford, supra note 13, § 22.03
54. Id. § 22.04.
55. Muñoz, supra note 52, at 225.
56. Id. David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American 
Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 164 (2012).
57. Bradford, supra note 13, § 22.04.
58. Id. Muñoz, supra note 52, at 228. 
59. Bradford, supra note 13, § 22.04. 
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leasehold interests.60 Louisiana law expressly makes mineral leases 
susceptible to mortgage.61
In the Gloria’s Ranch case, Wells Fargo had a combination of a 
borrowing base revolver with two kickers: the traditional ORRI and the 
NPI. Both of these interests are non-operating interests that are “carved 
out” of the working interest, but do not arise from true assignments of the 
working interest.62 Therefore, though Wells Fargo had “points of contact” 
to the lease through these interests, that contact did not reach the lessors. 
Wells Fargo also had the Mortgage on the leasehold interest, giving Wells 
Fargo the conditional right to seize and sell that interest upon a default. 
Given that there was no default, and Wells Fargo never seized the lease, 
Wells Fargo did not actually have any direct connection to the plaintiffs in 
this case at any point during the life of the lease. The “relationship” was 
only indirect through Wells Fargo’s financing contracts with the lessees. 
Despite this attenuated connection, there is no great mystery as to why 
Gloria’s Ranch pursued Wells Fargo. Cubic and Tauren are both small
                                                                                                            
60. Muñoz, supra note 52, at 227 (“Banks usually secure the loans with a 
mortgage or deed of trust on the oil and gas properties that are being acquired or 
developed with the proceeds of the loan.”); Jason A. Schumacher, E&P Lending: 
Due Diligence and Collateral Legal Issues in E&P Lending Deals for the Texas 
Law Man in Practice, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 361, 365 (2013) (“The Credit 
Agreement will have a covenant that a certain percentage of the value of the 
properties in the borrowing base be under mortgage; it is normally a high 
percentage but not always 100%”). Additionally, in most states, if a lender has a 
security interest in the minerals prior to extraction, the Uniform Commercial Code 
creates a UCC interest in the produced minerals as as-extracted collateral. 
Louisiana provides for the same effect, provided that the act creating the 
security—usually a mortgage—specifies that the security attaches to the minerals 
upon their being reduced to possession. LA. REV. STAT. § 10:9-102(a)(6) (2015). 
This specification is in the form of a “pledge” of the minerals produced or the 
proceeds from the sale thereof. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:204(B) (1989). 
61. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:203 (1992).
62. Texas Independent Exploration, Ltd. v. People Energy Production-Texas 
L.P., 2009 WL 2767037, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2009): 
An “overriding royalty interest” is a non-participating interest in an oil 
and gas lease. . . . An owner of an overriding royalty “has no right and 
thus no ability to go onto the underlying property and drill or otherwise 
take action to perpetuate a lease”. . . . Rather, such an owner is dependent
on the lessee to preserve the lease.
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, MANUAL 
OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 601 (14th ed. 2009):
Net Profits Interest: A share of gross production from a property, 
measured by net profits from operation of the property. It is carved out 
of the working interest.
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operators who entered bankruptcy shortly after the trial.63 Wells Fargo, as 
a dedicated provider of capital to exploration and production projects, 
should have pockets deep enough to satisfy any judgment.64 Tauren and 
Cubic were essentially judgment-proof, leaving EXCO and Wells Fargo 
as the only solvent parties with any connection to the lease. As mentioned 
earlier, EXCO settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial. After that, it was 
only through Wells Fargo that the plaintiffs could hope to see some sort of 
substantial compensation for the harm they suffered. 
2. Second Circuit’s Grounds
Justice Bleich’s dissent on the rehearing denial of Gloria’s Ranch is 
overwhelmingly concerned with policy considerations and limits its legal 
analysis of the liability issue to a mere two sentences: “I believe this 
determination was legal error. Solidary liability is never presumed and 
arises only from a clear expression of the parties’ intent or from law.”65
This latter statement is a correct statement of law–but was already 
noted in the original Second Circuit opinion.66 The extensive discussion of 
the issue in that opinion should be sufficient to ward off any notion that 
the panel reached its decision by presumption. It is, by all appearances, a 
good faith attempt to determine the scope of liability for the breach of a 
legal obligation.
The Second Circuit accurately perceived that the obligee(s), under 
Mineral Code article 206, is only a “former owner” of an extinguished 
mineral right.67 Therefore, the universe of parties who could be held liable 
for a failure to provide a recordable act declaring the extinguishment of a 
mineral right is confined solely to parties properly categorized as former 
                                                                                                            
63. See Lilian Rizzo, Cubic Energy Files for Chaper 11 Bankruptcy, WALL 
STREET J., Dec. 14, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cubic-energy-files-for-
chapter-11-bankruptcy-1450104346; Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing 
for Bankruptcy, In re Cubic Energy, Inc., No. 15-12500 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
64. Still, Wells Fargo’s investments have exposed the company to risk. See
Dan Freed, Wells Fargo Energy Investment Unit Sought Risky Deals, Faces 
Losses, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZNZ8-L57H:
Wells Fargo Energy Capital had a $2.1 billion portfolio as of January 2014 
. . . . Many analysts expect the value to eventually be marked down. . . . 
[A]s the price of oil has reversed, Wells Fargo may be regretting its deep 
and wide involvement with the sector. The bank has already set aside $1.2 
billion in reserves for possible losses on energy loans. Barker estimates the 
bank will need to set aside another $600 million.
65. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1225.
66. Id. at 1219.
67. Id. at 1218.
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owners of that right. The task was thus to determine which of the 
defendants qualified as a former “owner” of the lease, which was the
mineral right at issue.
As noted by the Second Circuit, a lessee’s interest in a mineral lease 
is susceptible of co-ownership, such that many parties could 
simultaneously be partial owners of a lease.68 For there to be co-ownership 
of a mineral lease, two or more mineral lessees must own undivided 
fractional interests in the same mineral lease.69 The panel pointed out that 
ownership in the civil law conveys three rights to the owner of the thing: 
usus, or the right to use; fructus, or the right to the fruits; and abusus, or 
the right to alienate.70 The court then determined that Wells Fargo, in fact, 
did have each of these rights in the lease through its relationships with the 
lessees. This determination was made despite the fact that the Second 
Circuit correctly overruled the trial court’s finding that the Mortgage 
contained an assignment of the lease’s working interest.71
The Second Circuit found that Wells Fargo had fructus of the lease 
because of an “assignment of proceeds” clause in the Mortgage and 
because of the existence of the overriding royalty and net profits 
interests.72 These provisions allegedly gave Wells Fargo the right to share
in production from the lease.73 Next, the Court determined that Wells 
Fargo was had usus because it purportedly exercised control over Cubic’s 
oil and gas operations, including holding the right to approve well 
locations and depths and actually directing Cubic to perform specific 
operations on other properties collateralized in the mortgage.74 Lastly, the
Second Circuit premised the finding of abusus on the notion that the 
Consent to Release Clause gave Wells Fargo control over Cubic’s ability 
                                                                                                            
68. Id.
69. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:168 (1975). 
70. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1223. See Campbell v. Pasternack Holding 
Co., 625 So. 2d 477, 484 n.13 (La. 1993):
Ownership may be characterized by its elements: the right to use (usus), 
the right to enjoyment (fructus), and the right to alienate (abusus). 
Ownership is also characterized by its forms: perfect ownership, with the 
elements of usus, fructus, and abusus; usufruct, with usus and fructus;
and naked ownership, with abusus. Under the Louisiana Civil Code and 
jurisprudence, holding in common means at least holding the same form 
of ownership in the same property. 
71. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1222: “Since the Cubic mortgage does not 
include the transfer of Cubic’s working interest in the lease, the mortgage did not 
include an assignment of the lease.”
72. Id. at 1223.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1223-24. 
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to release the lease.75 The court found it important that the vice president 
of Cubic informed the plaintiffs in 2008 that Cubic could not “release” the 
lease for a failure to produce in paying quantities because it was 
collateralized in Cubic’s credit facility with Wells Fargo. Based on these 
conclusions, the Second Circuit determined that Wells Fargo was a former 
“owner” of the lease.
3. Ownership of Mineral Lease
What is most jarring about the Second Circuit’s conclusion that Wells 
Fargo was a “former owner” of the lease is a number of correct 
determinations indicating the opposite, chief among them being that Wells 
Fargo never obtained a working interest in the lease.76 Despite pointing 
out the various ways in which Wells Fargo was not a former owner of the 
lease, the Second Circuit still held it to be one, and therefore liable for an 
article 206 breach.77 This was an error because Wells Fargo did not possess 
all three requisite elements of ownership – fructus, usus, and abusus.
a. Fructus
Wells Fargo enjoyed the fruits of the lease by way of the ORRI and 
NPI; through these interests, it was entitled to a portion of the proceeds 
derived from the sale of production from the lease. However, a claim to 
the fruits of something is not indicative of “ownership” of that thing. As 
Professor Yiannopoulos explained:
According to traditional civilian ideas, maintained in modern 
codes, civil fruits accrue by virtue of an obligation; hence one 
entitled to civil fruits acquires a “claim” for the collection of civil 
fruits rather than “ownership” thereof. Accordingly, the mode of 
acquisition of civil fruits is ordinarily a matter governed by the 
agreement of the parties and the law of obligations.78
                                                                                                            
75. Id.
76. Additionally, the Court noted that: the Mortgage did not contain an 
assignment of the lease to Wells Fargo; a mineral lease conveys the rights to explore 
and develop, to produce minerals, to reduce them to possession, and to assert title 
to a specified portion of the production; the right to receive a share of proceeds from 
a lease is distinct from a right to conduct operations on that lease; the Mineral Code 
declares that a mineral right is susceptible of mortgage. Id. at 1218-22.
77. Id. at 1224.
78. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PROPERTY §
2:30, (5th ed. 2015); Ross v. Ross, 857 So. 2d 384, 389 (La. 2003).
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The proper characterization of an overriding royalty and net profits interest 
is discussed in greater depth hereafter. For the purposes of the present 
section, however, it is enough to say that the holder of an overriding 
royalty is not thereby automatically the owner of a mineral lease. 
The Second Circuit mistakenly took the presence of an “assignment
of proceeds” clause in the Mortgage as evidence of Wells Fargo’s 
contemporaneous right to share in the production of the lease.79 This clause 
did not actually give Wells Fargo any pre-default rights to enjoy those 
proceeds. Though an assignment of production provision sometimes 
appears, if read in isolation, to be an unconditional assignment, it is in 
reality simply a collateral device.80 The assignment of proceeds clause 
operates to create a “pledge” of the produced minerals.81 A pledge is a 
security interest and nothing more. 
b. Abusus
The conclusion that Wells Fargo had the right of alienation as to the 
lease appears to be founded entirely on the Consent to Release Clause. The 
Second Circuit apparently believed that Wells Fargo “controlled Cubic’s 
ability” to alienate by way of this provision, and thus Wells Fargo shared 
some of that alienation authority. This determination was ostensibly 
bolstered by the testimony of the manager of Gloria’s Ranch, Ron Lepow: 
Lepow testified that he emailed [Cubic VP of Operations Jon] 
Ross in summer 2008 about releasing the lease for failure to 
produce in paying quantities. Ross responded to Lepow by stating, 
among other things, that he could not release Cubic’s interest in 
the lease because it was collateralized in Cubic’s credit facility 
with Wells Fargo. . . . Wells Fargo . . . controlled Cubic’s ability 
to release the lease for failure to produce in paying quantities.82
This reasoning is flawed on two fronts: Wells Fargo had no legal control 
over Cubic’s ability to provide any sort of release, and no “release” was at 
                                                                                                            
79. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1223.
80. “An assignment of production provision is a common feature of oil and 
gas mortgages. . . . Even though some assignment of production provisions, if 
read by themselves, appear to be unconditional assignments of the right to 
production proceeds, they are collateral devices and do not approach ‘true sale’
status.” Terry I. Cross & Jason T. Barnes, Oil and Gas Liens & Foreclosures – A
Multi-State Perspective, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 175, 181 (1998) (emphasis added). 
81. See supra text accompanying note 59.
82. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1223-24 (emphasis added).
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issue in the lessee’s failure to provide a recordable act evidencing the 
extinction of the lease. 
Mineral Code article 206 does not contemplate the “release” of a 
mineral lease at all. When a lease fails to produce in paying quantities, it 
automatically expires, and there is no longer anything to release.83 Article 
206 demands a written instrument acknowledging that the lease has 
expired. At the time of the demand from Gloria’s Ranch, there was no 
longer any mineral lease to alienate. Consequently, no one had the right of 
abusus for the lease at that point; it simply no longer existed. As such, 
Cubic had a statutory obligation to provide a recordable instrument 
reflecting that expiration.84 Cubic was not bound by the terms of its 
contract with Wells Fargo to withhold the furnishing of that recordable 
instrument because the “Consent to Release” clause literally only applied 
to active leases.
This might appear to be a purely academic distinction, as it is easy to 
imagine a situation where a former lessee furnishes the requested act of 
extinction, but the lessee’s mortgagee incorrectly believes the lease is still 
in force and is therefore being released. Under this counterfactual, a 
mortgagee would likely consider the lessee in default and might attempt 
to foreclose on the property through the provisions of its mortgage, 
perhaps seizing and selling it. This would present problems for the lessor, 
as the foreclosure might procedurally skip ahead of a lease expiration suit 
and would, in any case, scare off potential new leasing activity. This 
hypothetical reveals nothing about a right to alienate, however, because it 
only illustrates an example of a mortgagee acting without a right, believing 
it has one. This potential unlawful exercise of power cannot aid in 
determining whether Wells Fargo ever had a lawful right to alienate. 
                                                                                                            
83. There is no question that lawyers and courts often refer to the recordable 
act evidencing extinction as a “release.” See Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. 
Richardson, 884 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 
3d at 1209; Wood v. Axis Energy Corp., 899 So. 2d 138, 146 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 904 So. 2d 702 (La. 2005). That usage is easily understood in context. 
However, any release of an existing mineral lease tautologically can only occur 
while the lease is in existence. For instance, mineral leases sometimes specify that 
a lessee is obligated to release all portions of the lease the lessee is unwilling to 
develop. See Wier v. Grubb, 82 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. 1955). This constitutes a true 
release of a mineral lease, rather than an acknowledgment that the lease is expired. 
This is discussed further below. 
84. Indeed, Cubic only had a statutory obligation at that point, as there are no 
ongoing obligations under a mineral lease that no longer exists. See supra text 
accompanying note 45.
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The Second Circuit in Gloria’s Ranch conflated two distinct legal 
rights: (1) Wells Fargo’s contractual right to consent to any release of the 
lease and (2) the right to release the lease. The first right exists and is a 
function of the contract between Cubic and Wells Fargo.85 Had Cubic 
decided to release the lease while it was still in force, Wells Fargo would
be entitled to proceed against Cubic alone for a breach of their 
agreement.86 If such a release had occurred, Wells Fargo could proceed 
against Cubic, but would have no rights to the formerly leased property, 
as the lease would be dissolved.87 The second right is inherent in any 
mineral lease,88 but is clearly not referenced, much less assigned, in the 
financing contracts with Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo itself could not 
independently “release” the lease under the terms of the contract or under 
                                                                                                            
85. Through the Consent to Release Clause. 
86. See Matter of Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co., Ltd., 117 F.3d 160, 178 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
87. Though an unauthorized release would be a breach of the contract 
between Wells Fargo and Cubic, it would not enable Wells Fargo to seize and sell 
the mortgaged property, which was just the Lease. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3307 (2017) 
states:
A mortgage has the following effects:
(1) Upon failure of the obligor to perform the obligation secured by the 
mortgage, the mortgagee may cause the mortgaged property to be seized 
and sold in the manner provided by law and have the proceeds applied 
toward the satisfaction of the obligation.
(2) The mortgaged property may not be transferred or encumbered to the 
prejudice of the mortgage.
This would prevent an unauthorized assignment of the Lease by Cubic to a third 
party and would enable Wells Fargo to ignore the assignment and proceed against 
the property itself. See Freedman v. Ratcliff, 162 So. 783, 785 (La. 1935): 
The pact de non alienando, in an act of mortgage, does not prevent the 
mortgagor from selling the property, subject to the mortgage, but gives 
the mortgagee the right to ignore a sale of the mortgaged property and to 
proceed only against the mortgagor.
But a released lease does not exist and is not “transferred or encumbered” by the 
release. This “property” no longer exists, and thus, cannot be seized.
88. As explained earlier, a true release occurs while a lease is still in 
existence. The lessee’s authority to unilaterally release any acreage is explicit in 
almost every mineral lease. The Gloria’s Ranch lease states, in Paragraph 10: 
Lessee may at any time and from time to time execute and deliver to 
lessor or file for record a release or releases of this lease as to any part or 
all of said land or of any mineral or horizon thereunder and thereby be 
relieved of all obligations as to the released acreage or interest.
Furthermore, even if a lease were silent on this point, Louisiana law allows for the 
release of all or part of the lessee’s interests. See Ottinger, supra note 45, at 326. 
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the law; had Wells Fargo declared to the plaintiffs that it was releasing the 
lease while the lease was alive, no legal effect would follow. Only the 
working interest owners could legally alienate their interests in the lease. 
Because of the mortgage, Wells Fargo could sell the lease, provided it 
was still active, at a private sale if Cubic had defaulted on its payments to 
Wells Fargo. This would only occur in the event of a default—a default 
that did not occur during the life of the lease. As Wells Fargo noted on 
appeal, this is no different than a residential mortgagee selling a 
homeowner’s house upon default and foreclosure.89 The right to sell 
mortgaged property in the event of default is a function of the right of 
mortgage, not ownership.90 Because of Louisiana’s bar on self-help 
recourse, such a sale only occurs after the designated judicial procedures 
are followed.91 Any rights Wells Fargo might have had under the Consent 
to Release Clause were never triggered. In the event of a true default by 
Cubic and a subsequent seizure, Wells Fargo would qualify as a working 
interest owner and would thereafter be potentially liable for an article 206 
breach. Under the facts presented in Gloria’s Ranch, however, only Cubic, 
Tauren, and possibly EXCO ever had a right to alienate the Lease.
c. Usus
The primary flaw of the Second Circuit’s ruling that Wells Fargo 
possessed the right of usus in the lease is identical to its error on abusus:
the court mistook a conditional, accessory right as evidence of an actual, 
current right.92 The fact that Wells Fargo could, in the event of default and 
after a seizure through judicial means, assume operational control of the 
lease does not entail that Wells Fargo ever actually possessed the right to 
use the lease.93 The post-default right to possession does not transmogrify 
a mortgagee into an owner prior to default. Wells Fargo’s potential ability 
                                                                                                            
89. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Wells Fargo Energy Capital, Inc., 
No. 51,077 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Matter of Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co., 
Ltd., 117 F.3d 160 and Freedman, 162 So. 783).
90. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3279 (2017)). 
91. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3279, cmt. (b) (2017) (“The requirement that the 
seizure and sale must be ‘in the manner provided by law’ emphasizes the long 
tradition in Louisiana of requiring recourse to judicial procedures and generally 
rejecting private sale or self-help as a method of execution.”).
92. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3282, cmt. (a) (2017) (“Mortgage is accessory to 
the obligation that it secures.”). (“[T]he rights of the mortgagee may not be 
enforced until the principal obligation is due and unperformed . . . .”) Id.
93. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3278 (2017); (“Mortgage is a nonpossessory right 
created over property to secure the performance of an obligation.”).
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to use the lease as a lessee was never triggered, and it therefore never had 
the right of usus.
The finding was not just that Wells Fargo had a right to take 
operational control in the event of default. Instead, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s finding that Wells Fargo did, in fact, exercise that right.94
Wells Fargo ostensibly “exercised control” over Cubic’s right to conduct 
operations on the lease by retaining the right to approve of well locations, 
well depths, and operating agreements, directing Cubic to perform 
workovers on other properties collateralized in the mortgage, and by 
reviewing Cubic’s financial statements.95
The right of use granted in a mineral lease is the “right to explore for 
and produce minerals.”96 A lessee has these rights, as do any assignees of 
all or part of the lessee’s working interest.97 This right entails that its holder 
is entitled to the proceeds of production but also is required to pay the costs 
incurred in the use of the right. A lessee can, however, contract with third 
parties to perform some of the legwork required in exploration and 
production activities, a fact apparent even under the facts of Gloria’s 
Ranch.98 Tauren hired Fossil Operating Inc. as a contract operator in 2007, 
and Fossil actually drilled several wells on the lease. Fossil “used” the 
right to explore for and produce minerals, but this right was still one that 
belonged to Tauren. Had Tauren cancelled its contract with Fossil, the 
latter company would not be entitled to explore for or drill anything. 
Similarly, Fossil could not have been liable to the lessors for any breach 
of lease obligations. In the same manner, even if Wells Fargo actually 
participated in the execution of any of Cubic’s exploration or production 
activities (a fact not apparent in the record), such participation was not 
evidence of any independent right of use.
Even more flawed is the notion that Wells Fargo’s right to review the 
financial statements or well information of Cubic constitutes a right to 
“use” the rights granted under the lease. Reviewing paperwork is not 
equivalent to exploring for or producing minerals. If it were, then 
accounting firms who have performed audits on lessees have, in so doing, 
                                                                                                            
94. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1223.
95. Id.
96. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:114 (1975). 
97. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:128 (1975) (“To the extent of the interest acquired, 
an assignee or sublessee acquires the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes 
responsible directly to the original lessor for the performance of the lessee’s 
obligations.”).
98. For examples of contract operators, see: Jardell v. Hillin Oil Co., 485 So. 
2d 919, 921 (La. 1986); Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (La. 
1999); Wood, 899 So. 2d 138.
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risked liability as “former owners” under article 206. This is simply not 
the case. Without access to this information, a secured lender would lack 
any significant ability to gauge his borrower’s ongoing ability to make 
payments.99
d. Summary
Wells Fargo was never an owner of the lease in name or in fact. A 
mortgagee of an oil and gas lease holds only a conditional right in a lease. 
In Gloria’s Ranch, this conditional right never became anything more. A 
party cannot “own” a mineral lease without any working interest in that 
lease. Because Wells Fargo was never an owner of the lease, it was not a 
“former owner” when that lease expired. The rulings to the contrary by the 
trial court and the Second Circuit were in error. 
B. Ownership of Other Mineral Rights
1. Overriding Royalty and Net Profits Interest
Wells Fargo was not a “former owner” of the lease and should not 
have been held liable for the failure to provide an act evidencing the 
extinction of that lease. Wells Fargo was the former owner of an overriding 
royalty interest and a net profits interest, both “carved out of” the lease. If 
these qualify as “mineral rights” under the Louisiana Mineral Code, then 
Wells Fargo was the former owner of those mineral rights. Might it then 
be proper to hold Wells Fargo liable for Wells Fargo’s failure to provide a 
recordable act evidencing the extinction of the ORRI and NPI? 
The answer is certainly no. First, overriding royalty interests and net 
profits interest are not “mineral rights” as that term is used in the Mineral 
Code. Mineral Code article 16 states, in pertinent part: “The basic mineral 
rights that may be created by a landowner are the mineral servitude, the 
mineral royalty, and the mineral lease. This enumeration does not exclude 
the creation of other mineral rights by a landowner.”100
Louisiana’s strong policy against dismemberments of ownership is
implicit in the framework of the Mineral Code and in article 16 in 
particular; landowners are presumed to have all rights inherent in property 
ownership, including the right to explore for and produce minerals.101 All 
                                                                                                            
99. This is an essential part of a lender’s ability to conduct ongoing due 
diligence on the borrower. See Schumacher, supra note 60, at 362.
100. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:16 (1975).
101. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:6, 31:8 (1975); this policy is evident in the 
existence of Louisiana’s unique mineral servitude regime. See Cohort Energy 
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“mineral rights” are derivative of the landowner’s original right to explore 
and develop his property for the production of minerals;102 hence, the 
specification in article 16 that landowners create mineral rights, and that
any rights in addition to the servitude, royalty, or lease must also be created 
by a landowner. The overriding royalty and net profits interests, on the 
other hand, are created out of the working interest by a working interest 
owner. Neither interest is a freestanding “mineral right” that exists on its 
own; both are mere interests in another mineral right. As a result, articles 
206 and 207 do not apply to either. 
This conclusion is in contradiction to decisions by the Louisiana First 
and Third Circuits. The former court stated, in Terry v. Terry that:
A mineral right is an incorporeal immovable. It is alienable and 
heritable. LSA–R.S. 31:18. The basic mineral rights are the 
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease. 
These mineral rights are classified as real rights. LSA–R.S. 31:16. 
Overriding royalties are, therefore, classified as real rights and 
incorporeal immovables.103
The Terry court cited to the Third Circuit’s decision in Duncan v. Paragon 
Res., Inc., which approvingly quoted the trial court for the proposition that
“[a]n overriding royalty interest is a mineral right, and, as such, it is 
classified as a real right and an incorporeal immovable.”104 Respectfully, 
these courts misunderstood the distinction between a mineral right and an 
interest in a mineral right. This split is clear in Mineral Code article 126
and its comment, which discuss interests “created out of the mineral 
lessee’s interest,” such as overriding royalties.105 The mineral lease is the 
right, and the ORRI is an interest derived from that right, rather than a 
right itself. The lessee is the only owner of the right.106
                                                                                                            
Co. v. Caddo-Bossier Pars. Port Comm'n, 852 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (La. Ct. 
App. 2003). The law of Louisiana regarding prescription of mineral interests 
reflects a historically strong policy against separate ownership of minerals 
and a policy of keeping land and minerals in commerce. 
102. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (1975).
103. Terry v. Terry, 565 So. 2d 997, 1000 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
104. Duncan v. Paragon Res., Inc., 417 So. 2d 850, 854 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 421 So. 2d 908 (La. 1982).
105. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:12 (1975) & Comment.
106. For an exhaustive analysis of the nature of the ORRI, which also 
characterized that interest as a “mineral right,” see Randall S. Davidson, The 
Overriding Royalty at the 27th Annual Louisiana Institute on Mineral Law 38-
109 (1980). 
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Second, even if Wells Fargo was the former owner of a mineral right, 
the plaintiffs may not have adequately demanded that Wells Fargo furnish 
an act evidencing the extinction of that mineral right. The plaintiff’s 
demand letter reads, in full: 
Gentlemen, Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. reviewed the information 
provided by Mr. Canaday regarding the Gloria’s Ranch 16 #1, 9
#1, and 10 #1 Wells. The above referenced mineral lease has 
expired because none of these wells are, or have been for some 
time, producing in paying quantities. Please furnish a recordable 
act evidencing the expiration of this mineral lease.107
The only expired mineral right referenced here is the lease itself. Even if 
an ORRI or NPI represented a separate mineral right, Gloria’s Ranch never 
actually demanded an act evidencing the extinction of either. Therefore, it
would not seem that Wells Fargo would have a corresponding obligation 
to furnish an act relating to either. As a practical matter, whether ORRIs
and NPIs are technically “mineral rights” or not, landowners are probably 
better off drafting all Mineral Code article 206 demand letters as broadly 
as possible. A demand for an act evidencing “any and all expired mineral 
rights formerly held” by the former owner might be safer for a landowner 
than more specific language.
Lastly, if the ORRI and NPI are considered distinct mineral rights, 
Wells Fargo would probably still not be liable for the same damages as the 
remaining defendants. The existence of a good faith dispute as to any 
expired mineral right other than a mineral lease precludes the landowner 
from collecting the damages detailed in article 207.108 It seems unlikely 
that Wells Fargo was in bad faith under the facts presented in Gloria’s 
Ranch.
2. Sublease
A more complicated “other mineral right” possibility is the sublease. 
Both Cubic and EXCO received partial “assignments” of the lease in 
Gloria’s Ranch. Though Cubic never addressed the issue, EXCO argued 
vigorously that its transfer from Tauren constituted a sublease.109 EXCO 
                                                                                                            
107. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 112, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202.
108. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:208 (1975).
109. EXCO’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Gloria’s Ranch, No. 541,768 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
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claimed a sublessee bears no article 206 duty and therefore cannot be liable 
for article 207 damages.110
A true assignment of a mineral lease requires that the transferor assign 
all of his rights to a given portion of the lease to a third party.111 As will 
be discussed later, this might occur through an assignment of a discrete 
portion of surface acreage or of a given subsurface horizon. A sublease, 
on the other hand, requires that the grant be of less than all of the 
transferor’s interest in the assigned property. The sublease is said to be a 
new lease “engrafted upon” the original lease.112 Louisiana has a long, 
complicated, and contradictory history on the sublease/assignment 
distinction, one that was not cleared up with the adoption of the Mineral 
Code.113 A true assignee will clearly be subject to the article 206 duty after 
the expiration of his portion of the lease, but a sublessee’s responsibility 
is less obvious. 
The considerations that render a holder of an overriding royalty 
something less than an “owner” of a mineral right are relevant to a 
determination of a sublessee’s obligation, if any, under article 206. Like 
an overriding royalty, a sublease is carved out of the lessee’s interest, 
rather than a landowner’s interest. Unlike a third party’s interest after a 
true assignment, a sublease is dependent on the continued existence of the 
transferor/sublessor’s interest.114 In many respects, it is easy to view a 
sublease as a mere interest in the mineral right of another, rather than an 
independent “mineral right” that a party can own. If that is the case, EXCO 
was correct that a sublessee is not a former owner subject to the duty 
imposed by article 206. 
On the other hand, as far as family resemblances go, a sublessee looks
much more like an “owner” than a holder of an overriding royalty 
interest.115 A sublessee acquires all of the rights and powers of the lessee 
                                                                                                            
110. Id.
111. Randall S. Davidson & Andrew D. Martin, Mineral Lease Division 
Revisited-An Old Doctrine with New Applications, 2 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 1, 
4 (2013).
112. See Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., 63 So. 3d 159, 
180 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
113. See Ottinger, supra note 45; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:127-130 (1975) 
reference subleases and partial assignments but do not attempt to flesh out the 
distinction. 
114. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:126 (1975). 
115. On “family resemblances,” see: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, P.M.S. HACKER 
& JOACHIM SCHULTE, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 65-67 (4th ed. 2009), 
where the phrase is used to highlight the fact that we can meaningfully use the 
same word-concept across many contexts, even if no single trait is common to all 
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to the extent of the interest acquired.116 On the same note, the sublessee is 
directly responsible to the lessor for performance of the lessee’s 
obligations.117 During the life of the lease, the sublessee looks and acts like 
a lessee for every practical purpose: he seems to possess and exercise 
fructus, usus, and abusus.118 It is true that the article 206 obligation is not 
an obligation of the former lessee qua lessee; it is a statutory obligation 
that applies to all former owners, rather than a contractual duty. It would 
be a curious asymmetry, however, for a sublessee to have all obligations 
of a lessee, both contractual and statutory, during the life of the lease but 
no statutory obligation after the expiration of the lease. This imbalance 
would be odd because it is seldom obvious whether a transferee is better 
classified as a sublessee or an assignee. 
The trial court in Gloria’s Ranch pretermitted discussion of the 
question of a sublessee’s obligation because it found, as a factual matter, 
that EXCO was better classified as a partial assignee.119 The Second 
Circuit, despite its in-depth analysis of Wells Fargo’s liability, did not 
touch this issue and reduced the total damage award by twenty-five percent
to account for EXCO’s assumed virile share. Given the amounts of money 
at stake, not to mention the implications for Cubic’s liability, the question 
should have been considered by the appellate court. 
C. The Policy Behind Article 206
The purpose of Louisiana Mineral Code articles 206 through 209 is to 
allow mineral owners an avenue to have their titles cleared easily, with 
penalties for recalcitrant parties who impede this process. The potential 
for an attempted foreclosure by a former lessee’s mortgagee after the 
lessee furnishes the required act, as described in Section IV(A)(3), 
certainly opens the door for a serious headache for the former lessor. Such 
                                                                                                            
usages. A lessee, a sublessee, and a mineral servitude owner may not have a single 
core characteristic in common, but there is a “criss-crossing network” of overlapping 
usages that makes reference to all three as “owners of a mineral right” sensible. That 
“network” is not apparent for the more limited ORRI or NPI interests.
116. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:128 (1975).
117. Id.
118. On abusus: the sublessee cannot independently “release” the prime lease. 
However, he can release his interest in the lease or sub-sublease that interest. See
Robinson v. N. Am. Royalties, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1384, 1388 (La. Ct. App.), 
amended, 470 So. 2d 112 (La. 1985).
119. Trial Court’s Reasons for Judgment on Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment by EXCO Operating, LP, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202 (Apr. 19, 2013). 
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an action might diminish the plaintiff’s ability to command top dollar on 
a future mineral lease. 
Article 206 specifies that the obligation applies to former owners and 
former owners only, as does the liability for the resultant damages stated 
in article 207. Parties who never owned a mineral right can severely impact 
the marketability of landowners’ property or cause them to incur 
substantial fees to clear their titles, but such parties are not implicated by 
the strict language of articles 206 or 207. Louisiana courts have previously 
construed articles 206 and 207 in this stringent manner. For example, in 
Adams v. JPD Energy, the Second Circuit denied attorneys’ fees to a 
landowner who successfully had a lease declared null.120 Because the lease 
was deemed to have never existed, it was not an extinguished mineral 
right, and the defendant was not a former mineral owner.121
The Adams holding probably belies the intent behind articles 206 and 
207: it potentially imposes harsher penalties on good-faith former 
operators than on bad-faith parties with no connection to the property. It 
is likely that the legislature intended to cast a wider net, one that would 
catch parties whose actions clouded the public records, like the defendant 
in Adams. That defendant was eventually determined to not be a “former 
owner” but appeared to be the record owner of a lease for all purposes at 
the time of the demand by the landowner. The defendant’s failure to 
furnish an act meant that the public records continued to incorrectly show 
that the landowner’s minerals were out of commerce.122
Similarly, a sublessee who does not provide the requested act has a 
recorded interest indicating continued rights in the landowner’s property, 
clearly clouding the title of the landowner and reducing the marketability 
of his rights. The former sublessee might claim that his interest is entirely 
dependent on the prime lease, such that potential lessees will be concerned 
only with the actions of the lessee and sublessor. This argument appears 
persuasive at first glance and mirrors the reason why a former ORRI 
holder does not truly cloud title. It is, however, flawed as a practical 
matter. The sublease and assignment distinction is so murky that 
Louisiana’s circuit courts cannot even remain internally consistent about
                                                                                                            
120. Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161, 164 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012). Full disclosure: the author’s law firm 
represented the landowner in this case. However, the case predates the author’s 
employment with the firm. 
121. Id.
122. Keeping property in commerce is, indeed, a public policy of this state. 
Lumber Products, Inc. v. Crochet, 156 So. 2d 438, 443 (La. 1963). The author 
would be remiss if he failed to acknowledge that Grant E. Summers made the 
Adams (87 So. 3d 161) policy arguments earlier and better.
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the proper characterization of a given type of transfer.123 Louisiana law 
should not demand that lay landowners and potential lessees answer a 
question that most courts apparently cannot, simply to determine if there 
is a competing ownership claim.
It is not apparent that the Adams or sublessee arguments hold for a 
former mortgagee of a former lessee, whose only claimed interest was a 
conditional one, never exercised. Though Wells Fargo’s mortgage was a 
matter of public record, it is unlikely that this would have dissuaded any 
potential lessees from leasing the Gloria’s Ranch property without an act 
of extinction in the conveyance records from Wells Fargo. Industry 
participants understand the accessory nature of a mortgagee’s interest. The 
trial court in Gloria’s Ranch accepted fact testimony to the contrary in that 
case, a finding affirmed by the Second Circuit.124 But since both courts 
erroneously found that Wells Fargo was a “former owner” of the lease 
itself, this factual question was actually irrelevant to the holding. 
There is no question that non-owners can cloud title to a landowner’s 
mineral rights, like the defendant in Adams, the hypothetical foreclosing 
mortgagee sketched out above, or a former sublessee. If the Louisiana 
Legislature intended to include these sorts of parties as obligors under 
article 206, using “former owner” was poor statutory drafting. To be more 
lucid about the legislative intent, the statute should have singled out both 
“former owners” and “parties who have a record claim of ownership” of a 
mineral right. Under this formulation, a landowner would have recourse 
against both true former owners and parties who have made an affirmative 
assertion that they are owners. Purely passive former mortgagees like 
Wells Fargo, whose only record interest was one that is universally 
recognized as accessory in nature, would remain protected. Though none 
is likely forthcoming, a revision to the statutes is in order to give effect to 
the legislature’s probable original intent. 
D. The Implications of the Gloria’s Ranch Mortgagee Liability Holding
Though it is unlikely that the consequences to oil and gas financing 
would be as apocalyptic as predicted by Justice Bleich, there probably 
would be severe consequences if the Supreme Court declined to overturn 
the Second Circuit on this point. Neutral observers have already predicted 
                                                                                                            
123. See Ottinger, supra note 45, at 331 (discussing the Third Circuit’s 
conflicting opinions in Cameron Meadows Land Company v. Bullard, 348 So. 2d 
193 (La. Ct. App. 1977) and Dore Energy Corporation v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 
997 So. 2d 826 (La. Ct. App. 2008)).
124. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1224: “Jaratt asserted Wells Fargo’s 
interests in the lease would create red flags for potential lessees.”
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a chilling effect on the flow of financing to oil and gas companies.125
Though surely many lenders who saw the potential for returns would 
continue providing capital to operators, the possibility of major liability 
would encourage them to lend less and on less favorable terms. This 
throttling of capital would hurt lessees, but it would be detrimental to 
lessors as well, whose mineral rights would become far less valuable as 
fewer market participants had less money to bid against each other. If the 
Gloria’s Ranch opinion was right on mortgagee liability, these policy 
considerations would be a clarion call for legislative action, rather than 
factors for the courts to weigh. The decision was not correct on this point,
and the potentially severe consequences should be reason enough for the 
Supreme Court to take up the issue.
Furthermore, the mortgagee liability holding creates more legal 
questions than it answers. For instance, if the mortgagee is a “former 
owner” of a mineral right, then it would obviously have been a “present 
owner” of the lease at some point. That entails that Gloria’s Ranch itself 
actually had statutory obligations to Wells Fargo during the pendency of 
its mineral right, pursuant to the correlative rights doctrine.126 It further 
means that the plaintiffs also apparently owed contractual duties to Wells
Fargo under the lease, as a synallagmatic contract.127 What lease rights 
could Wells Fargo have enforced against Gloria’s Ranch during the life of 
the lease? There is no obvious answer, casting more doubt on the Second 
Circuit’s determination. 
IV. SOLIDARITY OF THE OBLIGATION
A. Co-Lessee Liability
As detailed above, holding Wells Fargo liable at all was clear error. 
As detailed below, implicitly finding that EXCO breached its article 206 
obligation may have been error. But on the issue of the solidarity of Cubic 
and Tauren’s obligation, the Second Circuit got it right; those two 
                                                                                                            
125. See Tyler L. Weidlich, Lender Beware: Lender Held Liable for 
Borrower’s Failure to Release Mineral Lease, A.B.A. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://perma.cc/SAV9-U2UP; Tom Arceneaux, BLANCHARD, WALKER, O’QUIN 
& ROBERTS, https://perma.cc/24PD-YL5S (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).
126. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:11 (2006), which states that “The owner of land 
burdened by a mineral right or rights and the owner of a mineral right must 
exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the other. 
Similarly the owners of separate mineral rights in the same land must exercise 
their respective rights with reasonable regard for the rights of other owners.”
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2668 (2017).
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companies owed the same obligation (providing the Article 206 
instrument in response to demand) and the same damages for a failure to 
perform that obligation. These defendants argued that their damages 
should have been reduced proportionately to each defendant’s share of the 
Lease after the various assignments, an argument wisely rejected by the 
courts. 
Still, the Second Circuit took the wrong path to this correct result. The 
appellate panel’s misstep on the solidarity of the liability between the 
defendants was founded on the incorrect premise that “ownership of a 
mineral right, such as a mineral lease, is indivisible.”128 As putative 
support, the court cited to article 168, which actually states that “[m]ineral 
rights are susceptible of ownership in indivision.”129 However, mineral 
rights are also susceptible of division, along many possible lines. Though 
it is not divisible by a partial assignment or partial sublease, a mineral lease 
can be divided if the lease contains an “assignability clause” and the 
assignor assigns all of his interest in a portion of the lease.130 This division 
operates to divide the obligations due under the lease. The proper 
conception is of two separate leases, each with a distinct set of obligations 
due to the lessor.131 If the assignor of a divided lease breaches one of his 
lease obligations, the assignee will not be held liable.132 Similarly, the 
assignor and assignee must independently maintain their respective lease 
interests by separate production or operations after the primary term.133 It 
naturally follows from the “two new leases” picture that a lessee of a 
divided lease can only be liable for damages caused by his own failure to 
perform.
The divisibility of leases, under certain circumstances, is not in any doubt 
in Louisiana.134 The Second Circuit should not have suggested otherwise. But 
the court was correct in rejecting the oil company defendants’ claims that 
                                                                                                            
128. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1219.
129. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:168 (1975) (emphasis added). 
130. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:130 (1975) & Comment; Roberson v. Pioneer Gas 
Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931). 
131. Id. at 48.
132. Roberson, 137 So. 46; Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336, 344 (La. 1940).
133. Davidson & Martin, supra note 111, at 15-17; Roberson, 137 So. 46. 
134. However, a recent Second Circuit decision, Guy v. Empress, 193 So. 3d 
177 (La. Ct. App. 2016), effectively determined that a lease cannot be divided 
horizontally; that is, by an assignment of certain depths. This appears to be an 
inconsistent application of the lease division doctrine, for the reasons discussed in 
Davidson & Martin, supra note 111, at 9-13. However, it will likely be treated as 
controlling by subsequent courts, at least in the Second Circuit. By the logic of Guy,
none of the depth assignments in Gloria’s Ranch could have divided the lease. 
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their liability for damages should be reduced because of the various 
assignments of their lease interests. The “assignments” at issue did not 
divide the lease in the manner argued for by the defendants. Tauren took 
the lease in 2004 and assigned an undivided forty-nine percent of it to 
Cubic in 2006.135 This “assignment” did not serve to divide the lease 
because, as a fractional assignment, it was not a transfer of all of Tauren’s 
interest in any part of the Lease.136 Whether this was better deemed a 
partial assignment or a partial sublease, article 130 unambiguously 
declares that either cannot divide a lease.137 After the transfer, Cubic and 
Tauren shared all lease obligations and could benefit from any actions of 
the other that satisfied such obligations or met lease conditions. The Lease 
was not divided at that point, and so each owed the same performance–
their obligation was solidary.
B. Division of the Liability Across Depths 
In late 2009, Tauren assigned all of its interest in the deep rights to 
EXCO. On its face, this may suggest a division between upper and lower 
depths, at least with regard to Tauren’s interest, as that company had then 
divested itself of all deep rights interest. However, Cubic’s forty-nine 
percent interest stretched across both the shallow and deep rights. As a 
result, production or operations on the lower depths would have served to 
maintain the Lease as a whole, indicating that there was no division of 
lease obligations, benefits, or conditions. Again, because there was no true 
division of the lease, each party who owed an obligation to provide the act 
evidencing extinguishment of the Lease owed the same performance. 
Even if there were, in effect, separate leases on the shallow and deep 
rights after the transaction with EXCO, and further, if Tauren could not be 
held liable for any failure to perform as to the deep rights, the extent of 
liability would not change. The obligation is to provide a recordable act of 
extinction, and it applies to all former owners of a mineral right. Cubic 
and Tauren both qualify as former owners of the lease, and both count as 
                                                                                                            
135. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1207.
136. Again, under the reasoning of Guy, 193 So. 3d 177, even a transfer of 
100% of Tauren’s deep interest would not have served to divide the lease. 
137. The author has previously argued that a sublease can, in theory, divide a 
mineral lease—but only under a highly specific set of facts. See Davidson & 
Martin, supra note 111, at 6-8, 29. Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929). 
Under the reasoning of Hoover Tree Farm, 63 So. 3d 159, the Cubic-Tauren 
transaction would not be a true sublease, as there is no indication of a new lease 
“engrafted” on the original. 
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former owners of both the shallow and deep rights.138 Even though Tauren 
may not have held any deep rights after the EXCO assignment, it was still 
obliged to provide the recordable act upon demand as a former owner. 
Nothing in the language of article 206 suggests that this obligation is 
meant to only apply to the most recent former owner of a mineral right. 
Louisiana is home to some truly ancient leases, some of which were 
assigned in whole a century ago.139 The language of article 206 entails that, 
if a demand is made on him, an assignor from 100 years ago is obliged to 
provide the recordable act evidencing extinguishment. Simply put, as 
former owners, Cubic and Tauren owed the same performance: they were 
equally required to furnish the act declaring that they no longer held any 
interest in any portion of the Lease, deep or shallow. 
Furthermore, even if the obligations were different (a separate 
obligation for each interest), Tauren and Cubic would be liable for the full 
amount of damages. Article 207 states that a party who does not comply 
with its article 206 obligation is liable for all damages caused by that 
failure.140 When it comes to lost leasing opportunities because of an article 
206 failure of multiple fractional lessees, it is impossible to realistically 
distinguish the extent of the harm suffered because of each lessee’s non-
performance. The cloud on the title caused by having “only” forty-nine 
percent of the rights tied up in a dispute will discourage potential new 
leasing activity roughly equal to having the entire lease so encumbered. It 
is just not the case that Gloria’s Ranch could have received forty-nine 
percent of the calculated lost leasing opportunity money had Cubic 
acknowledged extinction but Tauren did not. 
C. Date of Extinction of Mineral Right and Solidarity
The trial court reduced (and the Second Circuit affirmed) the damages 
due by the remaining defendants by twenty-five percent, representing 
EXCO’s virile share thereof.141 This reduction suggests that the court 
decided that EXCO was, in fact, a former co-owner of the lease. Such a fact 
is far from clear, even apart from the sublease/assignment problem, because 
of the absence of discussion about when the Lease actually expired.
                                                                                                            
138. Unless, perhaps, if Cubic were merely a sublessee of Tauren. See discussion 
supra Part IV. B. 2. 
139. See Regions Bank v. Questar Expl. & Prod. Corp., 184 So. 3d 260, 261-
62 (La. Ct. App. 2016), dealing with mineral leases executed in 1907. 
140. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:207 (1982).
141. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1215, 1224 n.19. 
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The plaintiff’s claim in its petition was that the lease had expired at 
some point before suit for the failure to produce in paying quantities.142
The EXCO assignment did not occur until November 9, 2009.143 If the 
lease expired prior to that date, EXCO never actually acquired an interest 
in anything.144 Therefore, it appears that the courts implicitly determined 
that EXCO did in fact acquire an interest in the lease and that the lease 
subsequently expired at some point between November 10 and December 
31, 2009. Neither court explicitly specified any date of lease expiration. 
The court did appear to use the eighteen month period prior to January 28, 
2010 as the appropriate span to consider in the paying quantities analysis,
but it did not give any reasons for selecting this total duration, as opposed 
to a shorter one.145 Nor did the court explain why the date of the demand 
was the proper endpoint to work backwards from, rather than some earlier 
date in the secondary term. This lack of explanation may indicate that the 
Second Circuit did not even consider the issue. If EXCO never was an 
owner, it could not have been a solidary obligor, and no reduction for 
EXCO’s settlement was warranted. 
Determining the day of a mineral right’s death with some degree of 
precision is crucial. Selecting an exact date will clearly be, to a large 
degree, a legal fiction. This is especially true in the lease context, where 
there are no rules dictating the appropriate span to consider in determining 
whether the right has been maintained.146 In cases like Gloria’s Ranch,
where millions of dollars are at stake in the resolution of the question, it is 
a necessary legal fiction. Courts and litigants need to employ a more fine-
grained approach to the issue. 
                                                                                                            
142. Petition, Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d 1202, ¶ 6: 
The Lease or, alternatively, a portion of the Lease, has expired for a lack 
of production in paying quantities.
143. Gloria’s Ranch, 223 So. 3d at 1208.
144. Id. at 1209. 
145. The Second Circuit noted that Louisiana courts generally use a 12-month 
to 18-month period to evaluate whether or not a well is producing in paying 
quantities. Id. at 1211. Like every other Louisiana court that has dealt with the 
issue, it did not explain what factual conditions made the actual period selected 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
146. See id. The requisite suspension of disbelief as to the exact date a mineral 
royalty or mineral servitude expired is less dramatic given that both rights have a hard 
ten year prescriptive period of non-use. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:27, 31:85 (1975). 
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CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Gloria’s Ranch traversed a wide field 
of complex legal issues, many of which were not discussed herein. Its 
determinations regarding the standards for a “paying quantities” analysis 
and on damages for failure to properly pay royalties were well stated and 
unquestionably correct. Other courts should look to the opinion on these 
conclusions. Courts can and should also learn from the Second Circuit’s 
discussion of the article 206 obligation. This facet of the opinion should 
serve as a reminder that it is essential to begin with the most basic 
questions about the mineral rights (or purported mineral rights) at issue in 
a given case, such being:
(1) What is the alleged mineral right? 
(2) What are the characteristics of ownership for that mineral right?
(3) Does the party in question own the mineral right, or an interest 
in the mineral right?
(4) Was the mineral right itself actually co-owned? 
(5) When did the mineral right expire? 
(6) How did the mineral right expire? 
Riding on the proper resolution of these questions is something greater 
than the enormous sums of money at stake in cases like Gloria’s Ranch:
the coherent development of Louisiana’s mineral law. Eventually, an 
appellate court will have to address some of the unanswered questions 
related to article 206 identified herein. To steer the jurisprudence in the 
right direction and avoid another dubious revolution, that court will need 
to work from the bottom up, piece by piece, by carefully identifying the 
rights and remedies available to each party.
